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Abstract
The role of triage in digital forensics is disputed, with some practitioners questioning its reliability for identifying evidential data.
Although successfully implemented in the field of medicine, triage has not established itself to the same degree in digital forensics.
This article presents a novel approach to triage for digital forensics. Case-Based Reasoning Forensic Triager (CBR-FT) is a method
for collecting and reusing past digital forensic investigation information in order to highlight likely evidential areas on a suspect
operating system, thereby helping an investigator to decide where to search for evidence. The CBR-FT framework is discussed and
the results of twenty test triage examinations are presented. CBR-FT has been shown to be a more effective method of triage when
compared to a practitioner using a leading commercial application.
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1. Introduction
Triage is a technique used in many disciplines, most notably
in the field of medicine as a way of prioritising injured or ill
patients for treatment [25]. It can be viewed as a way of organis-
ing a workload to allow for the efficient allocation of available
resources [10]. More recently it has found its way into the Cy-
bersecurity lexicon where it is used to categorise threats [35]
allowing an organisation to determine during incident response
which events should be dealt with first based on their severity
and available resources [11]. When applied to digital forensics
(DF), the meaning of triage differs depending on the context
in which it is applied but, as Casey [15] suggests, its goal is to
speed up an investigation by attempting to identify evidential
exhibits and files quicker.1
Triage can mean the prioritisation of physical exhibits for
investigation (for which we coin the term high-level triage) but
it can also signify an interrogation of data held on a target digital
device (which we call device triage, or DT). In addition to known
facts about a case, decisions made during high-level triage are
also commonly based on a suspected offence type or the physical
location of an exhibit at the scene of a crime.
DT involves the identification of evidence on a suspect system
from amongst non-case relevant data, while allocating as few
resources as possible [32]. DT is employed to speed up a DF
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investigation, attempting to cut down the time it takes to identify
evidence and is the focus of this article. Cybercrime and the use
of technology to commit crime are on the increase [17]. Bem et
al. [9] suggest that this is leading to increased caseloads which,
in turn, are causing difficulties in the field of DF.
High tech crime units are experiencing investigation back-
logs [42] and DF practitioners are facing increasing pressure to
effectively manage their workloads and process their investiga-
tions more efficiently. This has led to DF software developers
championing their DT tools as a way of increasing investigation
efficiency [1, 2, 19]. Pollitt [33] argues that these tools have
fallen short of the requirements needed to deal with current
DF cases. DF practitioners have yet to consistently use DT for
investigating digital media.
The United Kingdom’s Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) good practice guide for computer-based electronic ev-
idence [3] provides guiding principles for DF investigations.
However, ACPO [4] have been cautious to recommend DT ow-
ing to the perception that it carries an increased risk of missing
evidential files. We argue that DT has the potential to reduce
mounting case backlogs but to do this DT techniques must be
improved.
Apprehension over the use of DT may be due, in part, to a
limitation of many current DT applications, namely the use of
pre-coded and fixed scripts. Until a vendor releases a software
update these scripts can remain unchanged for months. This
means a DF practitioner is limited to using the same evidence
gathering script in their DT investigations, even though the way
in which a particular offence is committed may have changed. In
such a scenario the chance of missed evidence is increased, and
reluctance to conduct DT is understandable. Such scripts are
frequently derived from an estimate of which data types would
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be likely to reside on a system for a given offence. Consequently,
this approach opens up the DT process to criticism and, arguably,
to an increased risk of investigation errors.
DT can be applied at both the scene of a crime (pre-seizure)
and within the confines of the forensic laboratory (post-seizure)
[10], each with different purposes and consequences. Pre-seizure
DT aims to eliminate devices from an investigation and carries
the greatest risk of missed evidence as devices of low priority
may be omitted from an investigation due to time and resource
constraints. Any evidence missed during pre-seizure DT could
have serious ramifications, as evidence may be left with a guilty
suspect. Even though post-seizure DT occurs in a secure lab-
oratory environment and all the potential evidence is available
(providing pre-seizure DT has not occurred first), it is possi-
ble that an inadequate DT could still prevent an exhibit from
proceeding to a full examination, and thus, failure to find the ev-
idence. Current DT applications have been criticised for lacking
the investigative experience needed to extract relevant data from
a system [5].
In order to improve DT a greater emphasis must be placed
on achieving higher precision in the identification of relevant
evidence. One possible way to achieve this involves the reuse
of knowledge from past DF investigations in order to establish
where evidence is commonly found. Patterns of suspect activity
can help to isolate key areas of a system to be targeted during
DT. Reusing investigation data in this way would allow DF prac-
titioners to extract data from a system based on the probability
of evidence being present in particular locations. This could
transform the current approach of guessing where evidence may
be located into an informed decision based on where evidence
has been regularly found in the past.
This paper presents our Case-Based Reasoning Forensic
Triager (CBR-FT) which uses patterns of behaviour to detect
evidential activity in DT. Through the use of past DF case results
we demonstrate the tool’s ability to target evidential files. We
offer CBR-FT as a method of implementing knowledge reuse for
the benefit of DT. It also goes some way to answering Pollitt’s
call for triage to be treated “as a formal process that can be
measured for efficiency and efficacy” [33].
Current approaches to triage are discussed in Section 2. Sec-
tions 3–7 introduce the new CBR-FT framework and its func-
tionality. The results of twenty triage examinations are presented
in relation to the offence of fraud (Section 8). The precision
and recall of CBR-FT during DT are discussed and compared to
EnCase Portable [21], a commercial DF DT application.
2. Approaches to Triage
Research often focuses on the development of basic frame-
works that highlight general approaches to high-level triage [38].
There is little published research in the area of DT and even
when techniques are presented their functionality often remains
insufficiently tested as they are rarely used in actual DF DT in-
vestigations [28]. Commercial applications for DT do exist (e.g.,
[1, 2, 19]) but share the same fundamental weaknesses. Using
predefined scripts, an investigator executes the application and
data is automatically collected for review. These scripts are often
coded to search for and retrieve specific evidential artefact types.
This can lead to very large quantities of data being recovered
which the DF practitioner must then interpret.
In addition, commercial approaches to DT frequently use hash
set analysis and keyword searching to identify evidential files
without the need for a practitioner to view file content. Keyword
searching is a process of looking for relevant alphanumeric
strings which may be contained within evidential files on a
system [7]. Hash analysis involves the comparison of two file
hash values in order to establish a match [39]. A file hash value
is generated by an algorithm which produces a character string
which is unique to a given binary file. The MD5, SHA-1, and
SHA-256 hash functions are all commonly used in DF analysis.
Except in very exceptional circumstances [41], two files with
matching hash values will contain exactly the same binary data.
Using a hash set (a collection of hash values from known
evidential files) to perform a hash analysis of a target system
has the potential to lead to the identification of evidential files.
This process is often used in the identification of indecent child
images [16] through the use of the Child Exploitation and Online
Protection (CEOP) hash sets. Hashing can be used not only to
identify relevant files but also to filter out known non-evidential
files (e.g., standard operating system files) which could reduce
the overall time needed to carry out an examination. However,
as discussed below, both hashing and keyword searching ap-
proaches can limit the effectiveness of DT because they are too
restrictive, leading to a failure to identify digital evidence.
2.1. Limitations of Hash Analysis for DT
During hash analysis, should any aspect of a target file be
altered, (e.g., altering one pixel in a picture) the file’s hash value
would change even though the target file is essentially the same,
thereby rendering hash analysis ineffective. In addition, hash
sets must contain hash values of files known to be evidential.
What constitutes evidential value in one case may not in another,
especially in crimes such as fraud. This is unlike offences in-
volving indecent images, for example, where a single file can
be evidential regardless of the system on which it is found. For
example, a hash value from one particular corporate financial
file is unlikely to be of value when dealing with an investigation
from another company. In reality, such files would not exist
in both scenarios as these files maintain company specific data
and make hashing ineffective. Creating a hash set of files from
company A would therefore be unlikely to highlight files found
in company B.
A limitation of hashing is that it is defeated when a copy of
a file is altered slightly (e.g., by cropping a photograph). Korn-
blums [27] piecewise hashing approach uses a “context triggered
rolling hash” to highlight known files which have been modi-
fied or amended slightly but relies on a priori knowledge of the
modified files. Perceptual hashing is one way to combat these
limitations as it makes judgements about the human perceptual
similarity of files rather than by comparing their binary repre-
sentations. Perceptual hashing offers some flexibility as the user
can identify files which maintain a certain level of similarity as
opposed to an exact match [26]. However, perceptual hashing
2
maintains processing overheads which would increase the over-
all length of the DT process, thereby negatively affecting the
efficiency of the investigation.
Therefore, hashing techniques are only helpful in limited DT
scenarios. Hashing (both normal and perceptual) works well
for certain file types, particularly picture files (as they often
remain unedited by a user) and therefore lends itself to particular
offence types concerning these types of files. However, there
are many other crime types (e.g., fraud) which do not involve
the types of file for which hashing is well suited and require,
instead, semantic analysis of file content.
2.2. Limitations of Keyword Searching for DT
Keyword searching also raises issues for DT. First, keyword
searching can take a considerable amount of time which works
against the goal of triage which is to prioritise cases as quickly as
possible. Second, defining keyword dictionaries can prove prob-
lematic because, in many DT investigations, the surrounding
circumstances of the case may not yet be fully known, making
key terms difficult to identify. Third, the key terms identified are
subjective, being based upon the experience of the investigator,
leading to varying degrees of success. It must be noted, however,
that techniques to automatically generate key term dictionaries
do exist [36] including ontological structures which create and
maintain domain related keyword knowledge bases [20]. Al-
though such techniques have the potential to be manipulated and
applied in a DT investigation, the difficulty remains in automati-
cally generating a key term database on a subject (the case under
investigation) about which little is known at the time.
Finally, compound or compressed files may possess internal
structures which cannot be easily identified through a simple
binary keyword search. An example includes the latest .docx
files used in Microsoft Word which now maintain an internal
structure similar to those found in .zip files. Although techniques
are available to mount and display some of these file types, doing
so complicates the investigation causing it to take longer. The
final concern arises if evidential files exist in a format containing
no searchable text (e.g., a scan of a document).
2.3. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistic analysis techniques can prove useful for identifying
relevant textual documents [13]. However, in complex situations
such as fraud, it would need to be known in advance what
specific language would be used to indicate that a crime has
been committed. Although linguistic techniques may easily
identify chat orientated towards a specific evidential topic (e.g.,
grooming), it may not prove so easy in crimes such as fraud.
Distinguishing an evidential email from a non-evidential email
may not be as straight forward as analysing the text content of
both emails alone. What determines evidential value could be
the direction in which the email is sent (email metadata) and
this often requires capturing the file along with further analysis
provided by the practitioner. That said, it is noted that linguistic
analysis techniques might have a future role to play in DT. As it
lies beyond the boundary of the present work there is scope to
explore this area in future work to develop techniques to function
in conjunction with CBR-FT.
2.4. Relevant Evidence and Superfluous Data
A key concern when undertaking any DT investigation is
failing to identify all relevant evidence. However, this concern
has to be balanced against time spent during a DT investigation
collecting non-evidential data. Thus, an ideal DT system will
exhibit maximum precision (the proportion of files retrieved that
are relevant) whilst maintaining a suitable level of recall (re-
trieving relevant evidential files from a target system) to provide
adequate assistance during decision making for case prioritisa-
tion. Precision is an especially important measure. Because a
practitioner must review all recovered data to establish whether
any evidential files exist it is important to keep the volume of
data of no evidential value to a minimum. Often, evidential
files make up a relatively small proportion of the overall volume
of recovered data [22]. Sifting non-relevant data to extract evi-
dence requires an examiner to use their expertise or knowledge
of where evidence is situated on a system.
The CBR-FT framework aims to limit the gathering of non-
relevant data by targeting only known evidential areas of a sys-
tem based on past DF investigation experiences. The reason for
this choice is the hypothesis that when people save and store
files on their system they will tend to consistently use particular
locations. The evaluation (see Section 8) supports this view as
CBR-FT gave better results in evidence gathering tasks than the
file-type-based method used by EnCase.
Because CBR-FT does not rely on hash or keyword matching
it is harder for a suspect to circumvent DT by adjusting file
content to evade a hash match. Instead, CBR-FT is concerned
with extracting data from specific locations on a system reducing
reliance on maintaining keyword or hash sets which are often
incomplete or outdated. CBR-FT focuses on where evidence has
been located in previous cases (regardless of file type or content)
and targets these areas. As discussed in Section 8, this approach
to DT yields higher precision and recall.
3. What is CBR-FT and How Can It Be Applied?
We have previously suggested a framework for the reuse of
DF investigative knowledge for the auditing of DF examinations
[23]. This article builds upon the fundamental ideas previously
expressed and presents a fully implemented framework adapted
for use in DT.
3.1. CBR-FT Structure and Functionality
The CBR-FT framework provides a mechanism for gathering
the results of past DF investigations and utilising this knowledge
to predict the existence of evidence on a system for a given
offence type. The framework maintains a structure for gathering
and storing DF investigation data and employs user-contributory
case-based reasoning (UCCBR) [24].
UCCBR lets multiple DF practitioners record and submit the
results of their investigations as ‘cases’ to CBR-FT’s knowledge
base. This is achieved by the creation of a case shell, generated
by a script driving the practitioner’s proprietary forensic software
(in this case, EnCase [12]). The script regulates the format of
the practitioner’s case submission ensuring that data has the
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correct structure while allowing case specific data to be made
anonymous [23].
The case shell allows for a simple and efficient submission
process which makes minimal demands on the practitioner’s
time. Submissions are automated in an attempt to remove the
need for an expert to validate the content of each case. The
script validates the format of data in the case and only allows
a practitioner to enter details of files highlighted in their ex-
amination results (referred to as bookmarks in EnCase). Each
submitted case contains the locations (file paths) of evidential
files found on the suspect system and an investigator-assigned
evidence relevance rating reflecting the relevance to the case of
the evidence found there.2
Each location on a system that contains evidence related to an
investigation is given an evidence relevance rating (ERR) by the
investigating practitioner. The ERR represents the investigator’s
assessment of the relevance to the case of the evidence found in
that location. The ERR is a value between 0.1 (low relevance)
and 0.9 (very relevant) in increments of 0.1. For example, for a
particular case, evidence found at location C:\Folder might be
assigned an ERR of 0.8 to denote that the data found there was
highly relevant, that is, the evidence would be strongly relied
upon in determining the outcome of the investigation. Research
has shown that more fine-grained scales do not provide optimal
opinion information during a rating exercise [18, 34].
3.2. Bayesian Inference
The ERR is a measure of the perceived relevance to a case
of evidence for a given location. Bayes’ theorem uses prior
knowledge of probability distributions to make posterior infer-
ences about related events [40]. Therefore, it is well suited to
the DT scenario in which uncertainty exists about which areas of
a suspect system to interrogate for evidence, and knowledge of
the relevance of evidence in prior cases can be used to prioritise
locations to search in new cases.
CBR-FT uses the ERRs as a prior probability distribution in a
Bayesian model to determine the priority of particular locations
for searching during DT. The Bayesian model used by CBR-FT
is given in Equation 1. An explanation of the terms used in
Equation 1 is given in Table 1.
P(L|E) =
P(E|L) P(L)
P(E|L) P(L) + P(E|¬L) P(¬L)
(1)
The term being sought is P(L|E), the probability that a given
location, L, contains evidence, E, that is relevant to the case in
question. The known prior probabilities are P(L) (the probability
that location L is reported by an investigator) and P(E|L) (the
probability that evidence retrieved from L is relevant to the case).
P(L) is derived from the number of cases in the knowledge base
that contain evidence at the the particular location. P(E|L) is
the average ERR of the given location in the knowledge base.
2This article focuses on Microsoft Windows operating systems as 99.2%
of cases received by our supporting DF organisation were running versions of
Windows.
Thus, we know how relevant to past cases investigators judged
evidence in a given location to be.
From this we may calculate P(L|E) which we call the primary
relevance figure (PRF) for each location. The PRF is the inferred
probability that a given location is likely to contain evidence
that is relevant to a DT case. As new cases are added to the
knowledge base the PRF (i.e., P(E|L)) will change to reflect the
new case knowledge. Once PRFs have been calculated for each
location in the knowledge base a leaderboard can be created to
show areas of likely high and low importance on a given system
for a suspected offence type.
P(E|¬L) represents the likelihood that a practitioner would
miss relevant evidence at a given location. This value is given by
the investigator and is based on their knowledge and experience
of interrogating the locations during investigations. For the
example discussed in the next section, the P(E|¬L) values were
assigned by an independent practitioner after looking at all the
different locations contained within the case knowledge base.
Table 1: Definition of Terms in Equation (1).
Component Explanation
P(L) Probability that the location, L, is reported by
an examiner. This is derived from the number
of cases in the knowledge base that contain evi-
dence at a particular location.
P(¬L) Probability that the location is not reported by
an examiner.
P(E|L) Probability of evidence, E, at the location, L,
being important to case given the location is re-
ported by the examiner. This is a probability dis-
tribution generated from the evidence relevance
ratings given by a practitioner in each case.
P(E|¬L) Probability of evidence at the location being im-
portant to a case given the location is not re-
ported by an examiner. This is a value based on
the subjective judgment of the DF investigator.
3.2.1. Example
An example of the generation of a PRF for the MyDocuments
location is now presented. This location has a P(E|L) distribution
function value of 0.82, generated from the investigator-assigned
ERR values which denote the relevance to past cases of evidence
found in that location. P(E|¬L) has value of 0.1 reflecting the
low probability that relevant evidence exists at the location but
that an examiner has failed to report it. This value was assigned
by an independent practitioner.
The probability, P(L), of the MyDocuments location being
reported by an investigator is 0.53 (as it appears in 25 of the 47
cases in the knowledge base), therefore P(¬L) (the probability of
the MyDocuments location not being reported) is 0.47. It is then
a simple matter to use Equation (1) to calculate the probability,
P(L|E), of the MyDocuments location being reported given that
the evidence at that location is relevant, which is 0.90.
In this way CBR-FT is able to reflect that a particular piece
of evidence may be important to a particular case, but that in
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Figure 1: Demonstrates the PRF of each evidential location. As more cases enter the CBR-FT knowledge base, the PRF of each location fluctuates to correspond with
any findings in a DF investigation. Each observation on the seven plots shows the change caused by the addition of a new case to the knowledge base.
other cases evidence in this location may be of little importance
or that no evidence exists in this location at all. Triage carries
the inherent risk that important evidence will be missed when
prioritising cases to investigate. With the PRFs, which are are
representative of the way in which a particular offence has been
committed in the past, CBR-FT mitigates this risk by indicating
the locations most likely to contain relevant evidence for the
particular case type. Of course, for the PRF values to be reliable
(a true reflection of the relevance of a particular location in all
offences of a particular type), the CBR-FT knowledge base must
contain enough cases to accurately reflect its target population.
4. Knowledge Base Construction
A knowledge base should aim to reach a point of saturation,
that is, a size such that its set of sampled data reliably reflects
the population from which it was drawn [30, 31]. Determining
the saturation point depends on the size of the sample popu-
lation, and when a population is fixed or known a saturation
size value can be determined [29]. However, this research is
concerned with the investigation of criminal activity, and as the
ways in which digital crime is committed adapt with techno-
logical developments, then the location of evidence may also
change. Consequently, the CBR-FT knowledge base will not
have a fixed population; new cases will be continually added,
and true saturation is unlikely to be reached.
As a precise saturation point cannot be identified, the relia-
bility of the knowledge base is determined by the stability of
each location’s PRF. Fig. 1 shows how the PRF figures can vary
greatly during the initial stages of knowledge base growth. In
the initial stages the PRFs are less reliable but the variations
decrease as the knowledge base increases in size. However,
the complexity of DF investigations and the evolving methods
used to commit offences mean it is unrealistic to expect each
evidential location to achieve a static PRF. Therefore, the goal
is to reach a point where the PRF of each location undergoes
minimal change with the addition of new cases, that is, while
not saturated per se the knowledge base has become stable.
In the knowledge base used in this research the PRFs appear
have reached a level of stability as the addition of further cases
is not likely to dramatically change the PRF outcomes (see
Fig. 1). For example, when the knowledge base was being
constructed, at the point at which it contained only nine cases
the average change in PRF when the tenth case was added was
0.0457. However, the average change in PRF from case 46 to 47
was only 0.00857.
5. Using the Proposed CBR-FT for Digital Triage
CBR-FT conducts DT in two stages which are now discussed.
5.1. Stage 1: Extraction of Data from High Priority Locations
In Stage 1, CBR-FT extracts data from system locations with
the highest PRFs. These values are shown in Table 2 and rep-
resent the highest probability of locations holding relevant ev-
idence to the investigation. In this study we have focused on
fraud offences, and have constructed a fraud knowledge base
with associated PRFs (Fig. 2).3
In Stage 1, only locations with a PRF above 0.5 have been
used (i.e., locations more likely than not to yield relevant evi-
dence). The reason for this is to reflect the fundamental principle
in DT that resources are often scarce and as few of them as pos-
sible should be allocated when trying to identify evidential data.
Searching all system locations for evidence is inefficient, espe-
cially as many locations rarely contain relevant evidence. Table
2 shows the highest ranking locations and their associated PRFs.
3Note, different types of offence would have different characteristics which
would directly affect the locations that hold relevant evidence. In turn, this would
mean that a location’s PRF would likely differ between offence types, hence the
need for offence type-specific knowledge bases.
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Table 2: Locations used in Stage 1
Location PRF
User\Documents 0.903
User\Desktop 0.867
Local\Microsoft\Outlook 0.822
User\UserDefinedFolder 0.701
Volume\UserDefinedFolder 0.658
AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsLiveMail 0.658
User\Documents\UserDefined 0.585
Target System 
Fraud Offence 
FC1 FC2 
FC3 … 
Theft base 
TC1 TC2 
TC3 … 
Fraud base 
Primary Relevance 
Figures (PRF) 
Primary Relevance 
Figures (PRF) 
Stage 1 DT 
Figure 2: Structure of the CBR-FT framework for Stage 1. Distinct offence
types have their own knowledge base. Here, a fraud base contains a number of
cases (FC1 . . . FCn) and a theft base contains cases TC1 . . . TCn.
Should the results prove negative (i.e., no evidence is present
at any of the seven locations in Table 2), the DF practitioner is
faced with two ways to progress. First, the suspect system can
be removed from the case or lowered in priority for further in-
vestigation. Second, the examiner has the choice of configuring
CBR-FT to search locations with lower PRFs (≤ 0.5). Since
each evidence location’s PRF reflects the probability of relevant
evidence existing in that location, lower ranked areas will have
less chance of yielding evidential data whilst increasing the vol-
ume of non-relevant data returned (and the consequent effect
on precision). Ultimately, it is for the examiner to determine
the allocation of the PRF boundary and risk missing evidence.
However, if the initial sweep of locations with PRFs > 0.5 yields
no relevant evidence, configuring CBR-FT to collect data in
locations rated ≤ 0.5 is a way of confirming or falsifying the
initial results.
5.2. Stage 2: Data Extraction Based on Case Characteristics
When Stage 1 is complete and all data recovered from the
seven locations has been reviewed, an investigator has the op-
tion to proceed to Stage 2. If any of the locations were found
to contain evidential data they can be viewed as a potentially
incomplete profile of suspect activity on the system. Stage 2
takes this incomplete profile and focuses on identifying simi-
lar patterns of suspect activity in individual cases stored in the
CBR-FT knowledge base (Fig. 3).
For example, if Stage 1 recovers evidential data at the loca-
tions User\Documents and User\Desktop, Stage 2 involves
an analysis of cases contained in the knowledge base where
evidence had previously been reported at these locations. Each
case in the knowledge base is examined for matching activity.
If any cases are highlighted as containing evidence in the same
locations, any additional reported locations (which were not
examined during Stage 1) are collected for Stage 2. These loca-
tions will have a lower PRF than locations used in Stage 1 yet
could be relevant as both cases share characteristics. This stage
is designed to highlight any potential anomalous behaviour seen
in past cases where evidence has been found in locations which
may not be regularly reported.
Target System 
Fraud Offence 
Stage 1 Results 
Stage 2 
Results 
Stage 2 DT 
Fraud base 
FC2 
FC3 … 
FC1 
Figure 3: Structure of the CBR-FT framework for Stage 2. The cases FC1 and
FC3 are those cases in the knowledge base with locations matching those found
in the current investigation during Stage 1. These locations are analysed to
identify a further set of lower-priority locations of possible evidence.
To prevent an influx of additional locations, matching cases
are prioritised according to their match percentage. A match per-
centage is generated by identifying how many locations found
during Stage 1 are present in the knowledge base. By default,
Stage 2 results are generated from cases with a 100% match,
therefore in the above example, cases previously reporting ev-
idence at both User\Documents and User\Desktop will be
used.
The CBR-FT system is based on the hypothesis that similar
criminal activities share comparable traits. Modus operandi
(MO) is a synopsis of suspect behaviour and can be used to
identify an offence [43]. Each investigation undertaken by a
practitioner reveals a suspect’s MO which includes the locations
in which a suspect has left evidence [37]. This information
can be exploited to link past evidential activity to a current
investigation [6]. The start of a DF DT investigation presents
the greatest volume of data to be interpreted by an investigator
and posses a significant challenge [14]. Yet decreasing this set
of data whilst maintaining a high degree of recall would allow a
practitioner to carry out this task more efficiently. This can be
achieved by an analysis of past cases to target frequently seen
MOs and this concept is used by CBR-FT during DT.
6. Evidential Area Identification
CBR-FT is concerned with system locations rather than actual
files. By highlighting specific areas of a system, CBR-FT can
decrease the amount of non-relevant data retrieved during DT.
These specific areas are known as file paths and they must be
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generalised. A generalised path contains no personal or system
specific data, and can be applied to future DT cases. Each system
contains files and folders with names that are often unique to
a suspect. These file and folder names may differ in other DF
cases but their position in the folder hierarchy remains the same.
As CBR-FT is concerned with the location of data, CBR-FT
transforms each file path into a universal file path to ensure its
appropriateness for use in the knowledge base (Fig. 4).
Universal Path 1: Volume\Users\######\Desktop\
Actual Path 1: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\
Universal Path 2: Volume\UserDefinedFolder\
Actual Path 2: C:\Company Docs\
Figure 4: Example correspondences between universal file paths and original
evidential file paths.
Fig. 4 shows how both the user profile name and volume
label are generalised. All personal and system specific data has
been substituted to create a generalised path string. For example,
should the initial case have involved a suspect user profile of
John, clearly a path match would not occur during DT unless the
system being triaged also contained a profile named John. Issues
would also arise where multiple profiles existed on the system.
By standardising the path, ‘######’ can be applied to all target
systems irrespective of the profile name. The concept is similar
when using Volume as a standard volume label identifier. By
using UserDefinedFolder, unique folder names can also be
standardised.
Figure 5: The standard structure skeleton (SSS) is demonstrated (left) in graphi-
cal format, highlighting an anomalous folder in the suspect system (right) file
system.
One drawback of the universal file path is that looking at a
volume’s root folder has the potential for recovering large quanti-
ties of non-relevant data owing to the presence of system folders
containing standard operating system files (e.g., C:\Windows).
CBR-FT implements a standard structure skeleton (SSS) to iden-
tify which folders are made by a user and therefore available
for DT (Fig. 5). The SSS acts as a system structure hash and
is a record of folders that have been generated automatically by
a system and which often contain only system files. By main-
taining the SSS it is possible to mark these standard locations
so they are not searched. Any folder not in the SSS is flagged
as a UserDefinedFolder (e.g., Company Docs in Fig. 4) and
files in that location would be recovered (assuming the PRF is
above the specified threshold). Of course, if any file paths in the
SSS (including standard system areas) are identified as evidence
locations in any of the cases in the CBR-FT’s knowledge base,
then these areas are not restricted from DT. The SSS can be
amended to include additional locations to be omitted during
DT.
7. Evaluation
We have compared the use of CBR-FT against a leading
commercial DT application, EnCase Portable [21], as the two
systems take different approaches to DT. EnCase allows for the
recovery of data based on file type and offers a set of preset file
categories:
1. Picture files
2. Documents files
3. Emails
EnCase recovers data according to its category regardless of
where it resides on a system. This offers the advantage that
should a suspect attempt to hide evidence by placing it in an
unusual location, EnCase can still recover it providing it is of the
correct file type. However, there are drawbacks to this approach.
First, the onus is on EnCase to maintain a database docu-
menting all possible file types which may be relevant. Because
EnCase only searches for three categories of evidence, its scope
for evidence recovery is limited. If evidence exists in a form
outside these three categories EnCase will fail to recover it. This
could result in a case failing to proceed to a full investigation or
being given a lower priority.
Second, because EnCase gathers all files of the same file type
from a system regardless of their importance to the investigation,
the volume of data recovered could be unnecessarily large with
much redundancy, thus increasing the time needed to complete
a DT investigation.
CBR-FT’s focus on using known locations removes the re-
liance on establishing a known set of evidential file types. This
offers the potential to correctly pinpoint areas of evidence on
a suspect system which, in turn, might increase investigation
efficiency by reducing the volume of non-relevant data recovered
(increasing the precision). EnCase uses a fixed approach for all
investigations, and this may not be suitable in all circumstances.
CBR-FT can adapt, so as the knowledge base expands, CBR-
FT’s decision-making will change, reflecting the way in which
crimes are currently being committed.
The system was evaluated by taking twenty DF cases that had
previously undergone a full DF investigation by an independent
practitioner prior to this research. These twenty cases were all
concerned with crimes of fraud and were not contained in the
CBR-FT. It is against the evidence found during the 47 prior
investigations recorded in the knowledge base that the CBR-FT
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system is evaluated. The test cases used were selected on the
basis of their availability, that is, they were the twenty cases that
were made available by our contributing DF organisation.
For each case both EnCase and CBR-FT were used to run
a triage activity. Both tools were run without direct investiga-
tor involvement, CBR-FT by comparing each case against its
knowledge base and EnCase by executing its automatic DT data
gathering scripts. Note, fraud cases rarely contain evidence in
picture or image files. As an investigator would not be likely
to search for image files in this type of case it was decided not
to let EnCase retrieve files of this type as doing so would arti-
ficially increase the redundancy of the results and, hence, give
unrealistically low precision.
8. Results
This section presents the results of DT examinations of the
twenty separate cases of the same offence type (fraud) carried
out using EnCase and CBR-FT. System performance is evaluated
in in terms of recall and precision.
8.1. Stage 1 Results — Recall
Except in rare situations where the number of files involved is
low, a recall rate for relevant evidence of 100% is an unrealistic
expectation. Recall is the proportion of relevant evidence on a
target system that is recovered during DT. A DT process with a
high level of recall will be seen as more reliable and, ultimately,
more useful to a practitioner as a greater quantity of relevant
data will be recovered. Recall rates for this study are calcu-
lated by comparing the amount of evidence recovered during
DT with the evidence retrieved during the prior independent
investigations. We cannot say with certainty that the previous
investigator recovered 100% of the relevant evidence that existed
on the target systems, but all twenty cases had previously been
submitted to the DF practitioner’s client and were successful in
proving or disproving a suspected offence. Therefore, we take
the practitioner’s results as the de facto 100% target. Table 3
shows the recall and precision rates for EnCase and CBR-FT for
the twenty DT cases
It can be seen that CBR-FTs Stage 1 approach recovers more
evidence than EnCase’s automated collection scripts in 8 of
the 20 cases and that both techniques have equal recall in 10
cases. As EnCase extracts data by type rather than location,
where EnCase’s recall is low, it is due to evidence existing
in a format which is not targeted for collection and which is,
therefore, missed. In 15 cases, CBR-FT recovered fewer files in
total than EnCase (see Table 3) but matched or beat EnCase’s
recall performance by retrieving an equal or greater number of
evidential files.
There were two cases (16 and 17) in which EnCase out-
performed CBR-FT for recall. In these cases relevant evidence
existed in a location on the system which was not targeted by
CBR-FT because of its low PRF. However, this evidence ex-
isted in a format known to EnCase and so was collected, giving
EnCase the greater recall. Of course, if the investigator were
to proceed to CBR-FT’s Stage 2 and the evidence were subse-
quently found then when the case is added to the knowledge
base this location’s PRF would increase, making it more likely
to be searched in subsequent investigations. In the ten cases
showing equal performance evidence existed in a format known
to EnCase or a location searched by CBR-FT which caused both
methods to recover the same quantity of evidence.
8.2. Stage 1 Results — Precision
The precision of a DT process is the proportion of retrieved
data that is relevant, i.e., the number of relevant files retrieved
divided by the total number of files retrieved. Table 3 shows the
numbers of files retrieved by each method and the number of
evidential files that existed in that case. Because all retrieved
files will have to be reviewed by the investigator to determine
whether it contains information of evidential value, precision
is the more important measure for DT. A lower precision score
means a greater volume of non-relevant data is collected which,
in turn, makes the DT process longer and less efficient.
It is accepted that precision rates will generally be low due to
the large quantities of files residing on suspect systems and, as
evidential data commonly makes up only a small subset of the
overall number of files on a target system, there is a high chance
of non-relevant files being collected. Therefore, a goal of this
research is to improve the precision of DT.
Table 3 shows the precision of both EnCase and CBR-FT in
each of the twenty test cases. The precision rates attained by the
two methods differ markedly with CBR-FT, in some cases, out-
performing EnCase by an order or magnitude. A complementary
view is given in Fig. 6 which shows the number of non-relevant
files retrieved per evidential file retrieved.
The precision of each DT technique is sensitive to the different
ways in which evidence is stored on a suspect system. EnCase’s
precision is sensitive to file type. If a suspect maintains many
document files on their system, yet only a small proportion are
evidential, the precision will drop as all files of this type are
collected. On the other hand, CBR-FT’s precision is sensitive
to file location. If the suspect chooses to store large quantities
of non-evidential data in the same location as evidential data,
CBR-FTs precision will decrease.
CBR-FT’s precision score matched or beat that of EnCase in
17 of the 20 cases. CBR-FT’s precision was worse in 3 cases
(7, 8, 17) because the suspects in these cases had stored a lot of
non-relevant data in the evidential locations. What this means
for the investigator is that while CBR-FT retrieved evidential
files at a rate comparable with EnCase (a leading DF tool) the
higher precision means that less time would need to be spent
sifting the retrieved files to find the evidence. In cases where the
investigator thinks the amount of retrieved evidence is too low
and that more might be found, CBR-FT could be operated in its
Stage 2 mode to widen the net. This was done and the results
are presented below.
8.3. Stage 2 Results
Because EnCase does not offer a two-stage DT approach
the Stage 2 results only apply to CBR-FT. This stage offers
an optional approach to the examiner should they suspect that
further evidence may exist and wish to try and increase the
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Table 3: The recall and precision rates of EnCase and CBR-FT for the twenty test cases. For both systems the total number of files retrieved and the number of
evidential files retrieved are given from which recall and precision are calculated. The second column shows the total number of evidential files available for retrieval
for each case (i.e., the number of files found by the independent practitioner and which were sufficient for forensic needs). Figures in bold text indicate where one
tool outperformed the other.
EnCase CBR-FT
Case
Available
Evidence
Files
Files
Retrieved
Evidence
Files
Retrieved Recall Precision
Files
Retrieved
Evidence
Files
Retrieved Recall Precision
1 1 8706 1 100% 0.000114% 3621 1 100% 0.000276%
2 3 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 0% 0%
3 6 2758 0 0% 0% 65 0 0% 0%
4 6 9246 5 83% 0.054% 4759 5 83% 0.105%
5 7 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 0% 0%
6 9 11083 9 100% 0.00081% 7640 9 100% 0.001178%
7 10 13962 10 100% 0.072% 14065 10 100% 0.071%
8 14 95553 14 100% 0.0001465% 195896 14 100% 0.00007%
9 16 9182 16 100% 0.174% 2801 16 100% 0.571%
10 24 10010 7 29% 0.070% 3508 20 83% 0.570%
11 35 1774 0 0% 0% 7660 35 100% 0.004569%
12 49 8354 46 94% 0.551% 587 46 94% 7.836%
13 83 7403 44 53% 0.594% 3177 83 100% 2.613%
14 86 31123 57 66% 0.0018% 10046 81 94% 0.00806%
15 114 8257 30 26% 0.363% 683 102 89% 14.934%
16 121 11878 82 68% 0.690% 2544 36 30% 1.415%
17 262 15597 262 100% 0.016798% 5896 0 0% 0%
18 393 20447 1 0.3% 0.0000489% 1233 2 0.5% 0.001622%
19 776 33509 332 43% 0.010% 4751 364 47% 0.077%
20 1301 35491 1078 83% 0.030% 32535 1090 84% 0.034%
Table 4: Evidence locations highlighted in Stage 2.
Location PRF
C:\User\#####\AppData\Local\Microsoft\TemporaryInternetFiles 0.406
C:\Unallocated 0.335
C:\SystemVolumeInformation 0.329
C:\User\#####\Pictures\SamplePictures 0.329
C:\User\#####\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent 0.128
C:\User\#####\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer 0.018
precision of their DT examination. Test cases 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11
and 13 are excluded from Stage 2 DT as 100% of the evidence
was recovered during Stage 1 (see Table 3). Cases 2, 3, 5 and
17 are deemed anomalous in comparison to the other cases we
have presented and are discussed in section 8.3.1.
Test case 16 has been used to demonstrate the Stage 2 pro-
cess. Stage 1 confirmed evidence was present at locations
C:\User\#####\Documents and Outlook. Stage 2 involves
the identification of individual cases in the knowledge base
which have previously recorded evidence in the same locations
which were found during the current investigation undergoing
stage 1 DT.
As Stage 1 identified evidence at two locations (Outlook
and C:\User\#####\Documents) only cases in the knowledge
base containing both these locations are used. Analysis of the
CBR-FT knowledge base revealed eight of the cases within it
had previously documented evidence at both these locations (KB
cases 7, 9, 16 19, 22, 26, 44 and 47 in Fig. 1). This is seen as
a 100% match as all the evidence locations confirmed during
Stage 1 were confirmed in cases 7, 9, 16 19, 22, 26, 44 and 47.
In addition, these cases contained six other evidence locations
(Table 4) which had not been interrogated during Stage 1. Carry-
ing out Stage 2 triage on these locations for test case 16 revealed
that evidence also existed in the SamplePictures location and
this subsequently raised the recall of CBR-FT during DT in this
test case to 62% from 30%.
It is also possible to search the CBR-FT knowledge base
for cases with a partial match. For case 16 this would involve
looking for cases in the knowledge base that contained either
one of the locations found during Stage 1. This may increase
the chances of relevant evidence locations being returned during
Stage 2, but could also increase the volume of non-relevant
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Figure 6: The redundancy per evidential file retrieved for the twenty test cases (redundancy = no. files retrieved/no. evidential files retrieved).
locations returned and this approach was not favoured during
testing. The PRFs assigned to each location also assist the
examiner during Stage 2 when determining which additional
locations to collect files from.
Running stage 2 DT on the remaining four test cases where
case matches were based on a 100% match in locations, cases
4, 12, 14, and 15 saw no improvement in recall. The remaining
evidence in these cases was found in areas of the hard drive not
identified in the knowledge base. In case 10, the recall of CBR-
FT rose to 100% as the remaining evidence stored in the recycle
bin was collected as this location was identified. For cases 18,
19 and 20 no cases in the knowledge base existed with a 100%
match. Cases were then identified based on a 75% match. Using
locations from these matching cases improved the recall seen in
test case 19 to 68% and test case 18 to 0.8%. No improvement
was seen in test case 20.
8.3.1. Anomalies
We have highlighted cases 2, 3, 5, and 17 as anomalous in
comparison to the rest of the cases and these merit further dis-
cussion. In case 17, CBR-FT’s recall is 0. This is due to all
existing evidence being stored in the recycle bin. As nothing was
highlighted during Stage 1, it is impossible to carry out Stage
2 DT. However, we note in section 5.1 that in this scenario the
examiner has the option of expanding upon the locations chosen
during Stage 1 (see Table 2). The recycle bin location maintains
a PRF of 0.430 and is ranked 8th in our system, just outside
the top seven. If the examiner opted to capture data from this
location as we advise, the recall in case 17 would rise to 100%,
matching EnCase and with a precision of 0.044%.
In case 3, all evidence was found in the unallocated clusters
of the suspect system, leading to both techniques recovering
nothing and again leading to it being impossible to carry out
Stage 2. The unallocated areas of the system are ranked 11th in
our system with a PRF of 0.335. If, as with case 17, the examiner
chooses to expand upon locations in Stage 1, the potential to
locate this evidence is increased.
Cases 2 and 5 are both anomalous as the target system ap-
peared to be an empty drive, with evidential files found in unal-
located clusters. This explains the lack of files recovered by both
tools. As described above, unallocated clusters are ranked 11th
in CBR-FT and, therefore, should the examiner choose to follow
the Stage 1 directions, this area of the drive would be highlighted
and the potential for file recovery exists. However, it is noted
that due to the time penalties of analysing unallocated clusters,
this may be unsuitable for DT. Yet, in providing the PRF of the
unallocated clusters location and given the negative results found
during Stage 1, the information provided by CBR-FT should aid
the examiner in determining the priority of the case.
9. Conclusions and Further Work
Workload pressures on digital forensics investigators and the
increasing criminal use of computer technology suggest that
improved device triage techniques are required. This article has
demonstrated a new approach to device triage, CBR-FT. It has
been shown that CBR-FTs precision rate for the recovery of
evidential data during device triage is an improvement over a
leading existing commercial tool and that its recall (in 15 of
the 20 cases) was as good or better than the commercial tool.
In 17 cases precision was higher than that of EnCase, that is,
CBR-FT recovered more evidence and less non-relevant data
than EnCase. While this article has only used fraud crimes for
test cases, CBR-FT could be applied to other crime types and
this is an area for further work. In addition, the research only
focused on the Windows operating system, but the principles of
CBR-FT could also be applied to other operating systems.
9.1. Knowledge Base Time Sliding View
A limitation of the CBR-FT knowledge base is that it repre-
sents the most currently likely locations within a system that
contain evidence for a given offence type. However, the key
word here is currently; given the complexity of DF investiga-
tions and the range of methods used to carry out an offence,
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common evidential locations will likely vary over time, and
hence we introduce the concept of a time sliding view of crimi-
nal cyber activity. At present this concept remains untested yet
merits brief discussion.
DF investigations are complex and contain many forms of
evidence that can contribute to an offence. Some offences can
become dependent on technology and as technology changes,
then so will the location and its associated evidence. Let us
assume that for a given time t the knowledge base is effectively
saturated for t and therefore suitable for use in DT for cases
where the offence is committed at this time. However, at a later
time t′ an offence is committed; the knowledge base is only
saturated for t and might not be effective for DT at t′ as the
offence could present different characteristics. By adding new
cases to the knowledge base as they arise, the PRFs for each
location will be updated and saturation can be maintained. By
adding another case at t′, the knowledge base may no longer
represent t; it may now be representative of t′ and effective for
the DT of future offences.
Given that cases will be constantly added to the knowledge
base it can never become fully saturated, only reaching a level
of representation for a particular time; as the knowledge base
evolves, then so will the PRFs. Consequently, the CBR-FT
system may be able to reflect changes in the way offences are
committed. The adaptability of the PRFs produced from a time
sliding knowledge base is, therefore, a potential advantage over
current commercial systems, as it may have the ability to account
for the changes over time in the way offences are committed.
This would mean that where other techniques have a static script
based approach to DT, CBR-FT could change the locations it
searches based on the way in which a crime type evolves, derived
from additional cases entering the knowledge. This could, in
turn, increase the reliability of CBR-FT for DT. As noted, this
feature is at present untested and validation will be carried out
as more cases enter the CBR-FT system.
9.2. Prior Knowledge
In the next step (having acquired separate knowledge bases of
different offence types), the intention is to identify if an offence
has been committed using a target system without any prior
knowledge. It is suggested that user activity on a target system
may share similar characteristics to cases stored in the CBR-FT
knowledge base, and this will allow for the creation of profiles
of suspect activity. This technique would be useful in a suspect
crime scene device triage situations, for example when border
control agencies are attempting to carry out spot check exami-
nations of digital media. Further work would also consider the
possibility of incorporating notions of uncertainty using interval
probability theory, when determining the probability of evidence
being present. This would allow us to define the dependability of
any located evidence on a system in an attempt further improve
the CBR-FT’s precision and recall abilities.
9.3. Clustering
Beebe et al.’s [8] method of clustering improves informa-
tion retrieval performance for document searching. As part of
future work we anticipate the incorporation of a similar tech-
nique could increase CBR-FT’s precision performance. We have
demonstrated the ability to extract evidence from a case whilst
maintaining good recall, and improved precision rates. Large
quantities of non-relevant data can be excluded from an investi-
gation, significantly decreasing the amount of data a practitioner
needs to review. Yet, implementing Beebe et al.’s technique
over this smaller set of data could improve our precision fur-
ther, thereby allowing evidential files to be individually targeted
based on their related semantic content and is a consideration
for future work.
9.4. Expanding the Size of the Knowledge Base.
The number of cases housed in the current knowledge base is
47. The expansion of the current knowledge base through the ad-
dition of future cases will enable the reliability of the framework
to be monitored. As the PRFs of locations are affected when
more data is added, future case additions would highlight when
certain locations become more prominent in DT investigations.
As noted above (section 9.2), this would permit a more thorough
exploration of the time sliding view more thoroughly as well
as the exploration of the effects that a larger knowledge base
may have on future test cases. A limitation of this suggestion is
the availability of additional cases for submission to CBRFT’s
knowledge base.
9.5. Additional Knowledge Bases
An additional limitation of this research is that it focused only
on offences of fraud. However, CBRFT works by identifying
shared characteristics amongst cases of a given type. Therefore,
it is expected that the framework would also yield positive results
in the triage of different crime types where evidential areas could
be targeted in the manner demonstrated with fraud cases above.
As Fig. 2 shows, all that is needed is further knowledge bases
of cases belonging to different crime types. This will be tested
through the collection of cases for an additional knowledge base
documenting a different offence type and constitutes further
work to be carried out.
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